This paper explores the effect of between-race inequality on local public goods spending using a panel data set of local expenditures matched to non-rural U.S county and metropolitan statistical area (MSA) during 1980-2000. We measure the extent to which income inequality is accounted for by between-race disparities using the Theil Index, an entropy-based measure of inequality that can be decomposed into between-and within-group components. We find that the racial structure of inequality conditions the relationship between total inequality and public goods spending. As between-race income inequality increases, local public expenditure on education, police, fire, and park and recreation decreases, consistent with what social affinity model predicts. The effects are strongest across MSAs and in the subset of counties that encompass entire metro areas and invisible at the county level among counties in multi-county MSAs. We explain this with a mechanism of the competitive nature of the American urban environment and Tiebouttype force that constrains local governments not to decrease their spending on public goods despite the growing racial inequality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent research calls attention to inequality between racial and ethnic groups as a critical determinant of redistributive preferences and policies (Lind 2007; Hero and Levy 2013; Baldwin and Huber 2010) . Whereas classical public choice models of majority voting over redistributive policy assume that the median voter opts for a rate of redistributive taxation that maximizes her own post-transfer income (Romer 1975; Meltzer and Richard 1981; cf. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) , this newer body of research posits that voters also care about how redistributive policy affects social groups they feel "affinity" for, especially their own (Lupu and Pontusson 2011) . The classical models predict that jurisdictions with more income inequality will have higher levels of redistribution since the median income voter reaps greater net benefit from redistributive taxation the higher the mean income is relative to her own. By contrast, the more recent "social affinity" models predict instead that the impact of income inequality on redistribution will depend on how inequality is distributed between salient social groups such as those defined by race and ethnicity.
Where inequality between such groups constitutes a larger portion of the total inequality between citizens, those in the wealthier group will support redistribution less because they disdain transfers from their own group to the poorer group. As long as the pivotal influence on policy-making is drawn from the wealthier group, a higher degree of inequality between groups will engender lower levels of redistribution. Put differently, the structure of inequality, i.e. the degree to which it can be accounted for by disparities between and within groups, and not only its level should influence redistribution.
Beyond aspiring to help account for inconsistent empirical relationships between inequality and redistribution that often seem to defy the Meltzer-Richard model's core prediction (Benabou 1996; Alesina and Glaser 2004; though see Milanovic 2000) , models grounded in social affinity attempt to clarify and contextualize the relationship between ethnic diversity or fractionalization and the size of government. Scholars have proposed a number of reasons that diversity may lower redistribution and the provision of public goods, including preference heterogeneity between groups (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999) , the efficiency of imposing social sanctions (Miguel and Gugerty 2005) and fostering effective coordination (Habyarimana et al. 2007) , and selective altruism toward members of one's own group possibly combined with antagonism toward members of other groups (Luttmer 2001; Vigdor 2000; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Hero and Levy 2013) . Especially if this last class of explanation is valid, we would expect the impact of ethnic diversity on the size of government to be stronger where inequality between groups is higher. This paper explores the effect of between-race inequality on local public goods spending in the United States. It builds on research that has found interracial inequality to depress pure redistributive transfers in the United States and cross-nationally (Lind 2007; Hero and Levy 2013; Baldwin and Huber 2010) . Following this literature, we measure the extent to which income inequality is accounted for by between-race and within-race disparities (cf. Lind 2007; Hero and Levy 2013 ) using the Theil Index, an entropy-based measure of inequality that can be decomposed into between-and within-group components. After apportioning pre-tax income inequality into between-and within-race components in each non-rural U.S. county and each metropolitan statistical area (MSA), we examine the association of the between-race share of total inequality and various measures of local spending on public goods between 1980 and 2000.
We find that the racial structure of inequality conditions the relationship between total inequality and public goods spending, as predicted. Consistent with Tiebout sorting, the effects are strongest across MSAs and in the subset of counties that encompass entire metro areas and invisible at the county level among counties in multi-county MSAs. Neither total inequality nor ethnic diversity has consistent effects, reaffirming the need to consider these factors jointly.
II. THEORY: GROUP ATTITUDES AND SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC GOODS SPENDING
Social psychological research on group relations furnishes a strong basis for expecting that individuals will exhibit a preference for allocating resources to members of their own group.
Social Identity Theory posits that a motivation to achieve "positive distinctiveness" (Tajfel and Turner 1986) leads individuals to favor members of their own groups when dividing resources, even when group designations are arbitrary and without content and even when doing so compromises the general welfare, equity, and one's individual gain. Perceptions of zero-sum group competition over scarce resources can exacerbate such effects and generate outgroup derogation, leading to greater ingroup bias (Bobo and Kluegel 1997; Sherif et al. 1961 ).
Researchers have found strong relationships between measures of group animus and conservative fiscal attitudes, including opposition to redistribution. Notably, these findings often hold even when the policy in question has no overt connection to race or ethnicity. The most consistent findings link a variety of measures of white prejudice toward blacks to opposition to welfare (Sears et al. 2000; Gilens 1999; Lind 2007; Luttmer 2001; Bobo and Hutchings 1996) .
Some have also linked conservative fiscal preferences to opposition to immigration or antiLatino sentiment (Hajnal and Rivera 2014) . Ethnic diversity may also erode interpersonal trust, participation, and other forms of engagement with the public sphere (Putnam 2007) , a dynamic that is stronger among those high in racial animus (Costa and Kahn 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002) .
Consistent with theories positing in-group bias in the allocation of resources, researchers have often found links between racial or ethnic context and local or state economic policy.
States and localities with higher black populations tend to have lower expenditures on welfare and public goods (Hero 1998; Key 1949; Blalock 1967; Luttmer 2001; Vigdor 2000) . Poterba (1997) finds that areas where most of the elderly are white but most schoolchildren are nonwhite tend to spend less on public education. Gilens (1999) traces the rise of imagery of black Americans in news stories about welfare and argues that the increasing prominence of racialized portrayals of welfare beneficiaries led to falling support for the program among American whites after the 1960s.
Hispanic context has also been linked with such attitudes, though findings are mixed (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Fox 2004; Levy 2014) . Other studies find that ethnic diversity generally is correlated with lower levels of support for and provision of redistribution and public goods (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999) , though, here too, findings have not been consistent across studies (Hopkins 2011; Boustan et al. 2010) . Links between diversity and economic policy have been more elusive in cross-national studies of Europe, where diversity has been fueled heavily by immigration (Soroka et al. 2006; cf. Hooghe et al. 2008) , further suggesting that black-white animosity plays a special role in fostering aversion to liberal fiscal policies in the United States.
Assuming that at least part of the association between ethnic diversity and economic policy stems from the reluctance of members of wealthy and politically influential groups to accept taxation that they see as benefiting less wealthy groups, we would expect between-group inequality to dampen support for redistribution and the provision of public goods. In a highly diverse society where all groups have the same mean income, transfers would not benefit some groups at the expense of others. However, the more that between-group disparities account for total inequality, the more it becomes true that transfers impose a net cost on wealthier groups and a net benefit for poorer groups. Thus if members of the wealthy group prefer redistribution more when it helps their own group than another group, they will tend to resist transfers more wherever between-group disparities are large.
Corroborating this expectation, Lind (2007) finds that inequality within racial groups exerts a significantly more positive effect on state-level redistribution in the U.S. than betweengroup inequality. Hero and Levy (2013) observe that the share of total income inequality that can be accounted for by between race disparities has slightly increased in the United States between 1980 and 2010. They argue that the persistence of between-race disparities may work against more generous redistributive policies as a way of counteracting rising income inequality overall (Meltzer and Richard 1981) and show that between-group shares of income inequality at the state level over this period are negatively associated with spending on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). They also find that this effect is much stronger after the 1996 federal welfare reform that delegated more discretion over welfare policy to the states, a finding that may help explain Lind's weaker findings. Matsubayashi and Rocha (2012) find that the impact of states' black population shares on welfare spending depends on whether black-white income inequality is high (less spending) or low (more spending). Between-group inequality has also been shown to negatively predict redistributive spending cross-nationally (Baldwin and Huber 2010) .
Research to date has focused on welfare and other pure redistributive transfers, but we argue that social affinity-based models imply that between-race inequality should affect the provision of public goods as well. So long as tax policies are not extremely regressive and public goods allocation is not extremely skewed toward the wealthy, 4 individuals with lower incomes will reap a net gain from spending on public goods. As a consequence, we would expect that (H1), at a given level of total income inequality, a larger between-race share of inequality reduces pressure for public spending on public goods. This effect should be strongest where non-Hispanic whites are the wealthiest and largest ethnic group, which remained true in most U.S. counties and metro areas during our period of study .
Although H1 is well supported by psychological theory, there are two important reasons for caution. First, it assumes that spending on local public goods is determined politically rather than structurally. Given the constraints local governments are under in a federal system to compete for high tax-paying individuals and produce public goods needed to support an employer base (Peterson 1981) , this assumption is uncertain. Even if the hypothesized effects on public opinion manifest themselves, local governments may not respond to these shifts in preferences. Second, it assumes that group identities are salient to people when making such decisions. Pure redistributive policies may be more racialized (Gilens 1999 ) than spending on public goods such as education, fire protection, police, parks, and sewerage, so group inequalities may engender less resistance to spending on these goods than on welfare. On the other hand, links between racial attitudes and context and spending on public goods have been found in previous research (Trounstine 2015; Alesina et al. 1999; Poterba 1997; Myers 2007 ).
Thus, the negative effect of between-race share of inequality on spending on public goods may not be observed in the counties that are nested around the competitive urban environment.
The implication of Tiebout-type force is that when voters who do not like the decreased spending on public goods have alternative locations to relocate at low cost, the local governments in the competitive settings will be constrained in reducing public goods provision in spite of increasing racial inequality. This would be particularly the case when they are the wealthier group as local governments would not want to lose these taxpayers. As a consequence, we would expect that (H2), the negative effect of between-race share of inequality on public goods would be stronger in our metro sample but the effect would be weaker or non-existent in the county sample, particularly for the counties that many comprise the MSA. In other words, in the counties that only a few of them comprise the MSA, there is less competition among the local jurisdictions and the Tiebout-sorting force should be limited and thus stronger effects of racial inequality on public goods.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN DEPENDENT VARIABLE
For dependent variable, we use the quinquennial U.S. Census of Government data for 1982, 1992, and 2002 . This dataset has 527 variables of public expenditure categories for various forms of subnational governments including federal, state, county, city, township, housing and park authority, utility district, and school district. Among these, we select direct expenditure on public goods as following: highway, education, solid waste management, sewerage, health, hospital, fire, police, library, and park. We then aggregate all these fiscal variables of all subnational governments by counties. 5 All spending data are in 2011 dollars.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
We use the decennial U.S. Census data from Social Explorer for independent variables of demographic and socio economic status at the county-level. Both Summary Tape File 1 and 3 are   used for 1980, 1990, and 2000 . The initial number of observations of counties for each year is 3137, 3141, 3141. The variables include total population, population by age, aggregate income by race, households by race of householder, average and median household income, average household income by race, average family income by race, educational attainment for population 25 years and over, school enrollment for 3 years and over and the type of school, employment status for 16 years and over, and poverty status below 100% line.
We also considered population density as an independent variable. However, the correlation between the changes in log-transformed population density and the changes in logtransformed population over time was very high (0.92 between 1980 and 1990 and 0.99 between 1990 and 2000 in our county sample), indicating that the bigger the county, the higher their population density.
UNIT OF ANALYSIS: COUNTY, MSA, HOUSEHOLD, FAMILY
Study on public goods provision at the local-level in the United States is challenging because it is exceedingly difficult-if not impossible-to isolate the local government assignments from other levels of government as well as higher levels of government. Under complex provision system, multiple jurisdictions in a locality are responsible for the provision of the identical goods and services. In this sense, we caution that researches on municipal governments such as at the city-level or school district-level may not bring about accurate results unless the data is taking this into account. For instance, city spending data on particular public good (or spending data aggregated by city boundary) would not be sufficient if other local governments which jurisdiction does not lie within the city boundary contribute to the provision of the same good as well. For this reason, we choose county as our unit of analysis. We aggregate spending of all local governments for specific public good by county to avoid this issue.
Since we consider urban public goods provision, we do not include sparsely populated rural counties. Thus, we apply the 25,000 population cutoff as previous literature does (Alesina et al. 1999; Hopkins 2011 1980, 1990, 2000) . We also aggregate our spending data by MSAs.
The unit of recipients of public goods this study considers is households. We considered using individuals; because in our model we implicitly assume that race and ethnic groups affect the levels of public goods that governments provide, compared to individual measure, using household measure may create a disproportionate representation problem of voters across race groups due to different average household size. However, in most counties and MSAs in our sample, the majority of population was non-Hispanic ehite. 
MAIN VARIABLE OF INTEREST
Our main variables of interest are ethnic diversity, total income inequality, and betweenrace group share of total income inequality (racial inequality). Ethnic diversity is measured with the inverse of Herfindahl index and between-race group income inequality and total income inequality are measured by entropy-based Theil index. Between-race group share of total income inequality is the between-race group income inequality divided by the total income inequality.
(1) Ethnic diversity=1 − ∑ 2 , where denotes the share of household population as race i with householder and i = {non-Hispanic white, black, asian and pacific islander, american indian, and Hispanic}. Another challenge with using Hispanic household and family variable is that they are not mutually exclusive from other race categories. The race and ethnicity share of the five groupsnon-Hispanic white, black, asian, american indian, and Hispanic-does not sum to 1 whereas it does with the initial race categories in the Census. Therefore, we normalize these shares to 1 by adjusting the relative share size only between non-Hispanic share and Hispanic share where the discrepancy originates from. 13 Despite the normalization, this process will not change our results as the difference between 1 and our summed share is noticeably small. 12 Alternatively, we considered another strategy of applying the percentage of non-Hispanic white in 2000 to 1990 and 1980 . This is reasonable only when county population compositional characteristics have not changed significantly over the two decade. However, when we compared it to the individual race population which is available from the three decennial Census, we noticed that many counties deviate from this approach, potentially due to the influx of Hispanic immigrants during the period. For instance, according to individual race population variable, In Dade County, Florida, the percentage of non-Hispanic white among white was 59.77% in 1980. In 2000, it has reduced to 29.66%. Meanwhile, the percentage of Hispanic individuals in total population increased from 35.74% to 57.32% during the same period.
13 Ideally, we would need to consider this normalization also with other race groups because there would be some black, asian, and american indians whose ethnicity is Hispanic. But these numbers would be substantively small compared to white. Thus we do the normalization only for white. For instance, if the sum of the share of racial and ethnic group is 1.05 whereas the share of non-Hispanic group is 0.6 and Hispanic is 0.3, we adjust the share of nonHispanic white and Hispanic households in the following way: 0.6-(1.05-1)*(0.6/(0.6+0.3)) for non-Hispanic white households and 0.3-(1.05-1)*(0.3/(0.3+0.6)) for Hispanic households.
years old and over in the household, whether they are related to the householder or not. Income is pre-tax and post-transfer that includes wage or salary income, self-employment income, interest, dividends, and net rental income, and public welfare benefits such as social security income, supplemental security income, public assistance income (e.g. TANF), retirement income, and all other kinds of periodic income other than earnings.
There are 17, 25, and 16 income brackets in Census 1980 Census , 1990 Census , and 2000 for household income. We take the midpoint of income bracket to calculate each group's income share. A problem with using these income brackets is that the highest earner group's income is capped. In Census 1980 the top income is capped at $75,000. For Census 1990, it is $150,000.
In Census 2000, it is $200,000. Certainly, we do not want to take these incomes as the midpoint of the highest earner groups. Instead, we estimate these groups' average household income as follows. We sum the aggregate income of groups in each income bracket excluding only the highest earner group (by multiplying the number of households in bracket to the midpoint of income range) and deduct it from the aggregate household income which is separately available in each Census. The remaining is the aggregate income of the highest earner groups, assuming that within each income bracket, others groups' income distribution is centered on the midpoint of their income range. Then, we divide this remaining aggregate income of the highest earner groups by their actual numbers. This estimates average household income of the highest earner groups.
In spite of this strategy, we notice that some counties' estimated average household income is smaller than the capped income. This happens when the other groups' income distributions in each bracket are skewed toward the higher value of the income range (e.g. for the income bracket between $50,000 and $54,999, the distribution is skewed toward $54,999 rather than the $52,500 midpoint). For these observations, we replace the highest earner group's average income with the initially capped income because we certainly know that the capped income should be the one for these groups at the very least. When a race group's income share is greater than their population share, the Theil index becomes positive. If their income share is less than their population share, the Theil index shows negative values. Summing these race Theils over the five racial and ethnic group categories produces between-race group Theil for each jurisdiction. Between-race group Theil is supposed to be greater than zero but for a few counties, we note that they are negative values. This happens when the majority of household population in a county is non-Hispanic white but their income share is almost as the same as their population share. In this case, if other groups' income share is smaller than population share, then the sum of race Theil becomes negative albeit very small magnitude. We can view these jurisdictions as the ones with very small income inequality between race groups. Thus, as a matter of practice, we replace them with zeros.
(4) Between-race group share of total inequality=
. This is our primary independent variable and it measures the extent to which income inequality is accounted for by between-race disparities. Throughout the rest of this paper, we use the term "racial inequality" and "racial structure of inequality" interchangeably with betweenrace group share of total income inequality. 15 In this calculation, we treat that there is no significant difference between the average household income of Hispanic group who report them as white and that of Hispanic group as a whole. We checked this in IPUMS-USA database for the three decennial years with the national average: In 2000 with 1% national sample, the average household income of white Hispanic group was $45,919 whereas that of Hispanic group as a whole was $43,589 in 2000 dollar. In 1990 with 1% national sample, they were $31,809 and $29,981 in 1990 dollar (in the same order). In 1980 with 1% metro sample, they were $16,148 and $16,054 in 1980 dollar (in the same order). Unpaired two sample t-test shows that only in 1980, their difference was not significantly different from zero-i.e. in 1990 and 2000, they are different. However, we do not regard they were substantively different since the percentage of the average income difference in the average income of whole Hispanic group is very small at 6% and 5%, respectively.
In our county sample, the correlations between racial inequality and total income inequality in 1980, 1990, and 2000 are 0.53, 0.45, and 0.44 . The correlations between racial inequality and ethnic diversity in these years are 0.84, 0.72, and 0.73, respectively. Thus, we do not conduct cross sectional analysis when the correlations among our primary independent variables are this high. However, when we measure the correlations among the changes over time, the correlation of change between racial inequality and total inequality for 1980-1990 is -0.02 and 0.02 for [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . Also, the correlation of change between racial inequality and ethnic diversity for 1980-1990 is 0.001 and 0.21 for 1990-2000. Therefore, with our panel analysis, we disentangle the effect of racial inequality from its any component associated with ethnic diversity as well as total income inequality.
CONTROL VARIABLES
We use comprehensive control variables that previous literature has used. They are average household income (in 2011 dollars), log of population, fraction of old population aged 65 and over and college graduates among population aged 25 and over, unemployment rate and poverty rate. In robustness section, we add aggregate property value, aggregate gross rent (and median property value as well as median gross rent). In Table 1 .1, we report summary statistics for our county sample. The summary table for our metro sample is in Table 1 .2.
CONTROLLING FOR POLITICAL VARIABLE?
It is tempting to control for political variables (e.g. a share of voters who voted for Democratic candidate in the municipal mayor or state governor elections if the candidates were elected at around our three decennial years, the majority party of particular legislatures, or citizen ideology) for any models related to local politics. However, we argue that controlling for political variable will actually mediate the effect of racial inequality on public goods provision.
Time-variant political institutional arrangements that voters choose or switch to alter the level of public goods in their jurisdiction are likely to be the consequence of changes in our right-hand side variables-particularly for racial inequality and total income inequality. People's choices about taxation are often reflected in their votes for one party or the other. Thus, in the context of our model, one consequence of higher between-race group inequality would likely be more Republican control (because the median voters of particular race groups who contribute more to public goods through taxation will want more tax cuts), which would in turn generate lower levels of public goods provision. 16 Therefore, it is would be a wrong approach to control for party control or citizen ideology in our model because both are influenced by our treatment.
Doing so will rather mediate the effect of racial inequality on local provision of public goods.
On the other hand, if a political factor cause changes in income inequality between race groups, then we should control for it; if not, it will lead to omitted variable bias. However, in our model, it is hard to postulate that this is the case. Therefore, we argue that controlling for political variables in our model causes post-treatment bias and thus they are not included in the independent variables.
IV. EMPIRICAL SETUP: CAN WE CARVE OUT LOCAL PROVISION FROM HIGHER-LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT ASSIGNMENT?
Our panel analysis over three decennial years improves the concern on endogeneity by structure of the data, compared to cross-sectional analysis since we are examining the statistical association between the changes on the variables. In our basic model, we regress local governments' expenditure for public goods that an average household in the jurisdiction receives on our main variables of interest and controls. 17 Our primary interest is how the changes in between-race group share of total income inequality is associated with the changes in local governments' expenditure for public goods although we are also interested in its relationship 16 In the future, we plan to collect city, county, or state-wide election data to see whether our expectation on the positive association between racial inequality and Republican control is the case. 17 In Stata 13, we use areg command for regressions instead of xtreg. In Stata 10 and lower version, the standard errors of both regression models were the same but the only difference was about how the R 2 was calculated. In the areg procedure, Stata estimates coefficients for each of covariates plus each dummy variable for the groups of fixed effects (In our case, this is counties and MSAs). In the xtreg procedure, the R 2 is obtained by only fitting a mean deviated model where the effects of the groups are assumed to be fixed quantities. Thus, while sum-of-squares error is the same, areg produces bigger sum-of-squares total and thus bigger R 2 than xtreg does. In Stata 10 and higher version, in addition to the difference in the R 2 , the standard errors are calculated in a different way as well: xtreg does not correct for the degrees of freedom used to estimate fixed effects, while areg does. Thus xtreg in Stata 10 and higher produces standard errors somewhat smaller than those produced by areg. In this sense, areg procedure is more conservative in testing the statistical significance than xtreg. xtreg approach of not adjusting the degrees of freedom is appropriate when the fixed effects swept away by the within-group transformation are nested within clusters-i.e. all the observations for any given group are in the same cluster. Since our model clusters counties and MSAs in a group of fixed effects by each county and MSA as well, we concluded that areg approach is better than xtreg but please note that our results are not sensitive to xtreg approach. with total income inequality and ethnic diversity. Our panel data structure enables us to eliminate time-invariant unobservable characteristics at the county-level as well as at the MSAlevel. We employ this county and MSA fixed effect and year fixed effect as well.
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The key challenge in our model is whether we can carve out local provision of public goods from higher levels of government intervention. Arguably, we aggregated all fiscal variables of subnational governments by county. However, higher levels of government also invest in local public goods through intergovernmental revenue transfer. Although not perfect, in order to focus on local provision, following Peterson's recommendation (1981) , we deduct these intergovernmental revenue transfers from the aggregated spending of local governments.
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Nevertheless, this approach cannot completely carve out public goods provision of local governments as long as local government provision may be a function of intergovernmental revenue transfer from higher levels of governments. For instance, it is possible that some local governments strategically spend less on certain public goods, expecting that those gaps will be filled by the state or federal government's aids, particularly if the issue is about racial inequality that higher levels of governments care about. Or, it is possible that some salient race interest groups at localities influence state or federal government to transfer more (or less) revenue to their jurisdiction if the main beneficiary of the public goods is their ingroup. (Alesina et al. 1999 ). Equivalently, it may just be the case that higher levels of governments are more inclined to intervene to local governments with high degree of racial inequality.
Thus, we cannot separate local provision of public goods from higher levels of governments as long as local provision of public goods is a function of intergovernmental transfer revenue with respect to local racial inequality. For this reason, we regress intergovernmental revenue (from state, federal and both) on our right hand side variables to see whether our racial inequality variable is related to them and thus potentially indicate whether our concern is valid. We do this for each public good and reserve our interpretation when they are related. On the other hand, if they are not related, we interpret the results of our basic model with confidence. Some allocational public goods and services such as solid waste management, fire, police, park and recreation, and library do not have intergovernmental revenue transfer component at all and for them, we are more than confident to make our interpretation without all these concerns.
V. MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS
With our county sample, in Table 2 .1 from model (1) through (8), we do not see any statistically significant coefficient on racial inequality. The coefficients on racial inequality for education, police, fire, and park and recreation are all negative, in accordance with our theory but none of them is statistically significant at the conventional level. In contrast, when we turn to our metro sample, from model (9) through (18), we see quite strikingly different result. Now, the coefficients on racial inequality for spending on education, health, police, fire, and park and recreation are all significant with the negative signs.
Notably, Table 3 shows that intergovernmental revenue transfer on education from higher levels of government to local jurisdictions (aggregated by MSA) are not related to racial inequality. This corroborates our interpretation that as income inequality between race groups increases in a jurisdiction, the median voters in racial groups press their local governments to spend less on education. 1 point increase in the racial inequality is associated with $23 decline in education spending per pupil at metropolitan areas. For police, fire, and park and recreation, the interpretation is similar such that 10 point increase in the racial inequality is associated with $91, $37, $42 decline in per household spending on police, fire and park, respectively, at metropolitan areas. In particular, there is no intergovernmental revenue transfer for these allocational services: Local governments have the full discretion on the use of these funds. Thus, we are confident on the model (15), (16), and (17) without the concern on the involvement of higher levels of government in the local expenditures.
In model (18), we see the negative coefficient for library but it is not significant at the 90% confidence level. In model (11) for the spending on health and hospital, we see the negative coefficient albeit not significant. Noting that the dependent variable in model (11) is the sum of direct spending on health and hospital with the deduction of intergovernmental revenue transfer, we break down model (11) into a model with health spending only (12) and with hospital spending only (13). 20 The results show that the parameter of spending on health behaves differently than that of spending on hospital. Both models show the negative coefficients, but only the coefficient for health expenditure is significant at the 95% confidence level. From model (12), we find that, at least, the expenditure on health is consistent with our theory.
In model (14) for solid waste management and sewerage, we also see the negative coefficient but it is not significant. We also broke down this expenditure category into solid waste management and sewerage, separately, but neither coefficient was significant. We report our core finding on education, health, police, fire, and park and recreation at the MSA-level in Table 2 .2 with all coefficients on our independent variables.
Another finding from Table 2 .1 regards the role of total income inequality and ethnic diversity on public goods provision. First, there are no robust effects of both variables on various measures of public goods. At the county-level, total income inequality is positively associated with spending on highway, which is consistent with Boustan et al. (2010) and is negatively related to expenditure on fire and library, which is inconsistent with their findings.
But there is no such relationship at all at the MSA-level. Second, ethnic diversity, at the countylevel, is positively related to spending on solid waste management and sewerage and police. The result on police is consistent with Alesina et al. (1999) . However, the positive coefficient on diversity for solid waste management and sewerage is the opposite of their findings. Shifting to metro sample, we do not see any significant effect of ethnic diversity on public goods provision.
VI. DISCUSSION
We confirm our hypothesis 1 that income inequality between race groups reduces local governments spending on various public goods such as education, health, police, fire, and park and recreation. If this result appeared at the county-level, we would have used MSA-level result as for robustness check. However, the fact that the result disappears at the county-level but only appears at the MSA-level suggests that there must be some constraints on local governments in responding to racial inequality for their public goods provision and this depends on the size of jurisdiction as stated in our hypothesis 2.
At the county-level, the local governments may worry about losing their population once they take a firm stance in their public goods provision for racial inequality issue. This is particularly the case because racial inequality is such a sensitive issue. Moreover, there is competition among counties and thus local governments are inherently aimed toward spending more on policies for economic development (Peterson 1981) . Among the various public goods in our data, highways is the right policy candidate for such development (which Peterson labels as developmental policy). Indeed, in model (1) and (9), the coefficients on racial inequality are positive although not significant. Furthermore, in our model with metro sample, it is only highways for which the coefficient of racial inequality is positive among others. For highways, the coefficients on total income inequality are also positive both in county (p-value: 0.035) and metro sample. With these consistently positive signs (or no significant negative signs), interpretation could be that even in the presence of increasing racial inequality or total income inequality, local governments tend to spend more on highways and infrastructure maintenance.
On the other hand, at the MSA-level, exit cost of the residents should be higher than the cost at the county-level. Moreover, the competition among the jurisdictions should become loosened. Thus, in hypothesis 2, we expected to see stronger effects of racial inequality in reducing local governments spending on public goods as the size of jurisdiction increases from county-level to MSA-level. The negative effects of racial inequality on education, health, fire, police, and park and recreation support this claim. Later in our paper, we provide suggestive evidence for the mechanism that explains this.
Also, our inconsistent findings on ethnic diversity to Alesina et al. (1999) have two implications for the studies on ethnic diversity and public goods provision. First, it speaks to the importance of using panel data than a simple cross-sectional data. Arguably, our panel data explores the relationship of the changes between the two measures and thus is much closer to causal findings, other things being equal. Second, it highlights the significance of controlling for income inequality with a fine-grained measure such as the entropy-based Theil index other than a simple measure such as mean to median household income ratio and more importantly, controlling for the racial structure of income inequality. Only after controlling for the racial structure of income inequality, we could estimate the diversity per se effect on public goods provision.
After all, from Table 2 .1, comparing the robustness of the effects of the three coefficients over various public goods between county and metro sample, we conclude that only racial inequality shows robust effects on the government expenditure of public goods among the three primary independent variables.
VII. ROBUSTNESS CHECK

Omitted Variable Bias: Aggregate/Median Property Value
We note that aggregate property value could be a strong candidate for omitted variable.
In particular, Brueckner (1983; 2011) argues that local government may choose its public good output to maximize aggregate property value in the community. In view of urban economics, while local governments do have the power to make some spending adjustments without direct voter approval, property-value maximization is such a good tool to help them reach to socially optimal level of public goods provision. In our metro sample, we checked the correlation between this variable and our right hand side variables including those of our primary interest. The high correlation between log transformed population and log transformed aggregate property value raises our concern on multicollinearity; between 1980 and 1990 it is 0.70 and 0.81 between 1990 and 2000. Thus we run our basic model replacing log transformed population with log transformed aggregate property value among our control variables. We also ran our models controlling both for log transformed aggregate property value and log transformed population but the overall results do 21 The limitation of using this variable is that it only includes single-family houses on less than 10 acres without a business or medical office on the property. not change. In Table 4 , we only report the coefficients of racial inequality and log transformed aggregate property value of specified single-family house in our metro sample. Each first row of models is the main result from From Table 4 , we find that the results on public goods are robust. The exception is education. For the model on education, we notice that aggregate property value was omitted variable that biased the estimate in Table 2 .2. The degree that the log transformed aggregate property value is inversely correlated to public spending on education is so strong that the coefficient of racial inequality loses its significance. However, for health, and police, aggregate property value does not impact the government expenditure significantly and thus there is no difference on the effects of racial inequality; For fire and park and recreation, the aggregate property value does impact government spending but the effects of racial inequality remains robust (although its magnitude on fire decreases somewhat). Overall, except for education, our main results on health, police, fire and, park and recreation remain robust.
Since this variable only covers owners, from decennial Census we also chose "Aggregate Gross Rent for Specified Renter-Occupied Housing Units Paying Cash Rent" as a proxy for aggregate property value of rental housings. Results are very similar to Table 4 but racial inequality effects on the education spending remains robust with this variable. (The coefficient is -2232.18 and p-value: 0.030). We also ran the models with median property value and median gross rent separately. The results on both measures look very similar to the results with their aggregate terms.
Reverse Causation
So far we have highlighted that it is racial inequality that affects public goods provision as our statistical model assumes nearly contemporaneous effects. By the same token, however, it is possible that local government's provision of public goods influence racial inequality.
Particularly for education, this channel of reverse causality seems plausible (i.e. higher spending on public education may decrease or increase between-race group inequality over time).
Nevertheless, this concern that racial inequality is endogenous to the measures of public goods would not be applicable to the spending on health, fire, police, and park and recreation. It is hard to postulate that government spending on these policy areas could increase or decrease racial income inequality, although some may argue that for health and park and recreation, it still may be possible.
Although we cannot fully resolve this issue, we attempt to address it to some extent by giving time lag between our independent and dependent variable in our model. We regress the changes in our dependent variable between 1980 and 1990 on the changes in our right-hand side variables between 1990 and 2000 for education, health, and park and recreation. If there is a channel through which spending on public goods in earlier period affects the distribution of income between race groups, we would expect to see significant coefficients on racial inequality.
The result in Table 5 shows that this is not the case. Probably, this is due to insufficient decades that our data covers for reverse causal process to occur-we have only 10 year difference for our models in Table 6 . Thus, our estimates on the main results do not seem to be biased by reverse causation.
Measurement Error & Limitation of Data
The greatest concern for measurement error for this study comes from data limitation and comparability over three decennial years of the U.S. Census. However, we attempted to address these limitations. Among many, several major points are: 1) We used average family income by race, not household income for 1980 since this data is not available in Census 1980. In particular, using family income can face data limitation as some counties have missing values for confidentiality purpose. If the number of family in certain race group is small, the Census Bureau does not make it publicly available. However, we found that this was the case for only three counties in 1980 as our 25,000 population cutoff for urban county automatically deals with this issue. We dropped these three counties. Indeed, the average household size of white has changed from 2.67 to 2.54 between 1980 and 1990 and their average family size has become smaller as well from 3.19 to 3.06, both at the national level (Rogers 2000) . However, by adjusting the ratios of the estimated numbers to the actual number of white household and family in 1990 and 1980, we tried to minimize this error.
The fact that we went through this process for each county over time would also help minimize the measurement error. After this, we normalized the sum of the shares of racial and ethnic groups to be one for each county. But the normalization played a very small role as explained in our footnote. With these estimations, we further estimated the average household income of non-Hispanic white.
3) The number of household income brackets is different over the years. 
VIII. WHAT MEDIATES RACIAL INEQUALITY EFFECTS AT COUNTY?
In this section, we present suggestive evidence on the competitive nature of urban environment and the Tiebout-sorting force as a mechanism that mediates racial inequality effects at the county-level in Table 2 .1.
At extreme, if a metropolitan area contains only one county, there is no competition among the jurisdictions at the county level within the metropolitan area. The implication of the Tiebout-type force from an angle of jurisdictional competition is that the exit cost of the residents who do not like the decrease in public goods provision because of increasing racial inequality-the residents of certain race group who deviates from their median voters in their preference on public goods provision; Particularly, those who contribute more to the local revenue-is higher than those living in the metropolitan areas with many counties. It is because they have to relocate across metropolitan areas, not merely counties. Then, Tibout-type force should less constrain the local governments of these counties in reducing their spending on public goods. Thus, we would expect to see stronger effects (both in magnitude, sign, and significance) of racial inequality on public goods provision for these jurisdictions.
In contrast, if there are many counties in the same metropolitan area, local governments face more competitions from others and the exit cost of the residents becomes lower because the residents can relocate to other jurisdictions in the same metropolitan area at ease. For a group of these counties, Tiebout-type force should constrain the local governments more in reducing their public goods provision. Thus, we would expect to see weaker effects of racial inequality for the provision of public goods.
To test this, we measure the index for competition among jurisdictions within the same metropolitan area and we split our three decennial counties in the metro sample at its median value in 1990 data. 22 For measure of competition, we computed a Herfindahl index based on the adult population (18+ years) in each county within a metropolitan area. This index is the sum of the squares of the shares of the adult population of the counties located within the same metropolitan area. The number closer to zero indicates that there are many counties within the metropolitan area and they are relatively all small in size. Thus, the more potentially competing jurisdictions there are; a value closer to one suggests few alternative jurisdictions. 23 Table 6 shows the degree of competition for the two subsamples split by the Herfindahl index.
The results in Table 7 confirm the mechanism of competition among jurisdictions and Tibout-type force in mediating the racial inequality effect at the county-level. We see greater negative effects both in magnitude, sign, and t-value of the coefficient across the four types of public goods with the subsample (1), compared to (2) as we expected. For education, a subsample of county with less competition shows negative and greater magnitude (-3698.86 ) and significant coefficient (p-value: 0.059) on racial inequality. Shifting to a subsample with more competition, the sign becomes flipped with very small magnitude (42.89) and it is no longer significant (p-value: 0.971). The interpretation is the same for spending on health, police, and fire. The models for health and fire do not show any significance with subsample (1); however, the magnitude of coefficient and t-value becomes smaller from the subsample (1) to the subsample (2). The only exception is public spending on police in which the t-value does not decrease from subsample (1) to (2), but increases (p-value from 0.078 to 0.021). However, by the sign and magnitude, it is still consistent with our expectation.
Overall, we see consistent findings that there is weaker negative effects of racial inequality on public goods in county samples that face more competition from other jurisdictions within the same metropolitan area. This finding suggests that what mediates racial inequality effects at the county-level in Table 2 .1 can be explained by the mechanism of competitions among local jurisdictions and the Tibout-type force. This mechanism also explains, in contrast, why such effect emerges to appear in metropolitan areas.
VIIII. CONCLUSION
While there has been literature on the impact of ethnic diversity and income inequality on public goods provision both cross-nationally and within the United States, the study on racial structure component from the diversity and income inequality has been scant. Capturing this component is important particularly for the studies on the United States because racial and ethnic groups are systematically stratified along the income ladder at the local level. To our knowledge, this is the first direct study of the impact of racial structure of income inequality on public goods provision at the local level in the United States.
We find no negative effects at the county-level while such effect are present at the metropolitan area-level for education, health, police, fire, and park and recreation. While our results on education and park and recreation turn out to be sensitive, our core finding on health, police, and fire remain robust across various model specifications. We explained the contrasting results between county-level and MSA-level with a mechanism of the competitive nature of urban environment and the Tibout-type force. The suggestive evidence is that counties in the competing jurisdictions on the local labor market within the same metropolitan area are more constrained in responding to racial inequality for their public goods provision than counties with less competition. Thus, when racial inequality is growing, while median voters of racial and ethnic groups would press their local governments to reduce expenditure on public goods on one hand, other taxpayers-particularly those who contribute more to local revenue-would also press their local governments not to reduce public goods provision with their alternative locations to relocate at low cost when they reside in the competitive jurisdiction settings.
This raises an interesting question in local political economy as local politics, even when accounting for the role of higher levels of government, is not entirely determined internally under their jurisdiction for their policy outcomes against such visible issue of racial inequality, but are influenced by the neighboring localities because voters are mobile.
This study has direct policy implications for local jurisdictions in less competitive settings as these are mostly hit by racial inequality. Public goods are different from private goods in that it is designed to serve all citizens regardless of their race or income in the jurisdiction. However, when income inequality between racial and ethnic groups grows in these jurisdictions, our study shows that their spending on education, health, police, and fire for the average household declines. This invokes significant problem particularly for the poor who cannot afford to private education and health but have to rely on public provision. Furthermore, the service provision like police and fire negatively impacts all population in the jurisdiction.
Thus, policy-makers in these jurisdictions need to recognize that income inequality between racial groups is not only a matter of available private resources and quality of life for private individuals but also an issue of available public resources for their citizens and therefore are encouraged to take local initiatives to reduce income gaps between racial and ethnic groups. Or at the very least, they would have to pay attention to those who are at the bottom of the income distribution being exposed to the most damage from the dampened spending on these policy areas. However, the decline in allocational service provision implies that policymakers ultimately need to intervene for income inequality between racial groups to mitigate it.
Our approach of aggregation of local spending by county was to avoid complex service provision system among different levels of municipal governments in the United States. One important question that we want to pursue in future research is how racial inequality impacts public goods at the city-level. Cities would be more ideal to test our theory since the variation of spatial racial segregation would be greater within and between the jurisdictions. The spatial pattern of racial segregation may tell us more about the role of racial inequality for public goods provision than the measure of ethnic diversity at these smaller geographic units since it will enable us to understand what diversity means at smaller scale based on citizen's residence.
Recent research shows that more segregated cities spend less on public goods than less segregated cities (Trounstine 2015) . However, how the effects of racial inequality are related to
segregation is an open empirical question. To test this, researchers would have to address the complex assignment issue of public goods among different levels of local governments for the same good provision. To our knowledge, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy only provides publicly available Fiscally Standardized Cities database that addressed this issue for the largest 112 cities in the United States on yearly-basis between 1977 and 2012. Our expectation is that there may be no racial inequality effect at these cities even after taking into account racial segregation since these big cities are nested in the competitive settings. But we leave this empirical investigation to future research. The population of the most of these counties is less than 25,000 and thus information is not publicly available for confidentiality. Details are described in Data Appendix. other fire prevention activities.
TABLES
Park and recreation includes provision and support of recreational and cultural-scientific facilities and activities including golf courses, play fields, playgrounds, public beaches, swimming pools, tennis courts, parks, auditoriums, stadiums, auto camps, recreation piers, marinas, botanical gardens, galleries, museums, and zoos. It also includes building and operation of convention centers and exhibition halls. Libraries are for provision and support of public library facilities and services.
For each good and service, the expenditures of local governments from city, township, special districts, and school districts are aggregated by county. This is to avoid expenditure assigning issue to different levels of governments pertaining complex provision system. 
II. MSA DATA
Government Spending
The local governments spending for MSA-level data is the aggregate of county spending data by MSA. We also have a few negative values for spending due to our deduction of intergovernmental revenue transfer from higher levels of government. However, we have fewer numbers for these at the MSA-level. In 1980 , 1990 , the negative value of spending are 5, 6, 2 for highways, 1, 2, 0 for education, 5, 8, 17 for health and hospitals, and 25, 27, 35 for health only.
III. COUNTY IN MSA DATA
Sample
To test Tiebout-type force as a mechanism that mediates racial inequality effect at the countylevel, we used the county sample (1086 counties for 1980 and 1990 and 1080 counties for 2000)
that was used to construct metro sample. We mentioned data limitation issues particularly for Census 1980. This limitation issue becomes more prominent for 1086 counties in 1980 because there are 229 counties which population is less than 25,000. To overcome the limitation of missing values for the number of family and/or average family income of certain race groups, we employ the following strategy.
First, we find that 69 counties have negative values for the estimated number of Hispanic family who report them as white for which we used average family size from Census 2000. These are certainly errors originating from the change in the average family size over the two decades.
However, we note that the number of white family and our estimated number of non-Hispanic white is very close. Thus, we replace these negative numbers with zero, implying that there are no such Hispanic families who report them as white in these 69 counties. County and Surry County where black family share is greater than 0.5, their non-Hispanic white family share is greater than 0.99. This is tantamount to the presence of only one race group in the county. Thus, we make their racial inequality to zero, indicating that there is no inequality between racial groups. There is another county that we replace their non-Hispanic white family share with white family share because Hispanic share is very low. This is Charles City County in Virginia.
Third, there are 159 counties with missing values for the number of black family. Among these, when their black household share is greater than 0.01 (i.e. 1% of total household population), we replace the black family shares with these household shares. There are 28 replacements for this.
Fourth, there are 47 missing values for the number of Hispanic family. For these counties, however, the sum of the share of the other race groups equals to almost 1. Thus, we replace these missing values to zero.
In order to impute racial family share, we could replace some missing values with either household share of the same race or from another race's family share (in case of non-Hispanic white, from white) after carefully checking individual population race and household population race data altogether. This overcomes some hurdles of missing values in measuring ethnic diversity. Despite this strategy, when we have missing values for family income measures, it becomes difficult to measure racial inequality correctly. In particular, we have some missing values for the average family income of black group. When the black family share is greater than 0.1 and non-Hispanic white family share is less than 0.95, we concluded that we cannot ignore these missing values since, once they are available, they would significantly change the betweenrace group Theil. There are 23 counties for this case. Thus, we finally make our between-race group share of total inequality (racial inequality) to missing values for these 23 counties and they are dropped for the analysis. This is why our county sample for Table 9 is 3229, not 3252.
